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Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies,
lile is known about how incentives inuence performance in these tasks. In a eld
experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive eect of bo-
nus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives in-
crease performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance
threshold) they provide. e framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor
role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably
less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to
“explore” original solutions.
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1 Introduction
Until the 1970s, a major share of the workforce performed predominantly manual and
repetitive routine tasks with lile need to coordinate in teams. Since then, we have wit-
nessed a rapidly changing work environment. Nowadays, work is frequently organized
in teams (see, e.g., Bandiera et al., 2013) and a large share of the workforce performs tasks
that requiremuchmore cognitive eort rather than physical labor. Autor et al. (2003) ana-
lyze task input in the US economy using four broad task categories: routine manual tasks
(e.g. sorting or repetitive assembly), routine analytical and interactive tasks (e.g. repe-
titive customer service), non-routine manual tasks (e.g. truck driving) and non-routine
analytical and interpersonal tasks (e.g. forming and testing hypotheses) and document a
strong increase in non-routine analytical and interpersonal tasks between 1970 and 2000.
Autor and Price (2013) rearm the importance of these tasks in later years.
One main feature of non-routine analytical tasks is that they confront work teams
with complex and previously unknown problems. Teams are supposed to come up with
innovative solutions and, in order to succeed, they need to build up and recombine kno-
wledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Examples range from teams of innovative product
developers to management consultant teams who have to gather, evaluate, and recom-
bine information about their clients’ problems. While this idea of recombinant innova-
tion goes back at least to Schumpeter (1934) and has been formalized in growth theory
as “recombinant growth” by Weitzman (1998), it is also central in management research.
e concept of the recombination of ideas is at the core of the study of innovation, and
research has repeatedly found evidence for various forms of recombination as the main
mechanism producing breakthroughs; see, e.g., Fleming (2001), Hall et al. (2001), Rosen-
kopf and Nerkar (2001), or Gielman and Kogut (2003).
Given the pervasiveness of these tasks in modern economies and their importance for
innovation and growth, understanding the determinants of performance in these tasks
is crucial. One core question is how incentives aect teams working on these cogni-
tively demanding, interactive and diverse tasks. In many modern work environments,
contracts specify performance-related bonus payments as an important part of compen-
sation. While there is well-identied evidence about the behavioral eects of mone-
tary incentives on performance in mechanical and repetitive routine tasks such as fruit
picking, tea plucking, tree planting, sales, or production (see, e.g., Erev et al., 1993; La-
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zear, 2000; Bandiera et al., 2005, 2013; Shearer, 2004; Hossain and List, 2012; Delfgaauw
et al., 2015; Jayaraman et al., 2016; Englmaier et al., 2017; Friebel et al., 2017), evidence on
the eects of bonus incentives is lacking for non-routine analytical tasks in which teams
jointly solve a complex problem.
In this paper, we exploit a unique eld seing to measure the incentive eects for
joint team performance in a non-routine analytical task. We study the performance of
teams in a real-life escape game in which teams have to solve a series of cognitively
demanding tasks in order to succeed (usually by escaping a roomwithin a given time limit
using a key or a numeric code). ese games provide an excellent seing to study non-
routine analytical and interactive team tasks: teams face complex and novel problems,
have to solve analytical and cognitively demanding tasks, need to collect and recombine
information which requires thinking outside the box. e task is also interactive, since
members of each team have to collaborate with each other, discuss possible actions, and
develop ideas jointly. At the same time, real life escape games allow for an objective
measurement of joint team performance (time spent until completion), as well as for
exogenous variation in incentives for a large number of teams. Our particular seing
allows us to vary the incentive structure for more than 900 teams in all (with more than
4,000 participants) under otherwise equal conditions and thus enables us to isolate how
bonus incentives aect team performance.
Whether bonus incentives positively aect performance in such tasks is an open que-
stion as the production technology as well as the selection of workers performing such
tasks may dier. Compared to mechanical and routine tasks, non-routine analytical and
interactive tasks require more information acquisition, information recombination, and
creative thinking. ere is thus room for incentives to discourage the exploration of new
and original approaches (e.g. Amabile, 1996; McCullers, 1978; McGraw, 1978; Azoulay
et al., 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2013).1 Further, non-routine analytical tasks are more
likely to be performed by people who are intrinsically motivated (see, e.g., Autor and
Handel, 2013; Friebel and Giannei, 2009; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2010). In turn, extrinsic
incentives could negatively aect team performance by crowding out such intrinsic mo-
tivation (e.g. Deci et al., 1999; Hennessey and Amabile, 2010; Eckartz et al., 2012; Gerhart
and Fang, 2015).
1Takahashi et al. (2016) further argue that incentive eects may also depend on whether the task is
perceived as interesting.
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Recent evidence from related strands of the literature on incentives for idea creation
(Gibbs et al., 2017) and creativity (e.g. Gibbs et al., 2017; Ramm et al., 2013; Bradler et al.,
2014; Charness and Grieco, 2014; Laske and Schroeder, 2016), however, do not indicate
negative, but mostly positive incentive eects. While these studies provide interesting
insights into how certain types of incentives can aect idea creation and creative per-
formance, they almost exclusively measure individual production, instead of team pro-
duction (i.e. workers may face team incentives but work on individual tasks).2 One rare
exception is the small scale laboratory experiment by Ramm et al. (2013), which investi-
gates the eects of incentives on the performance of two paired individuals in a creative
insight problem, in which the subjects are supposed to solve the candle problem of Dunc-
ker (1945). e study nd no eects of tournament incentives on performance in pairs
but it is unclear whether this eect is robust, as the authors achieve rather low statistical
power.
Our unique eld seing allows us to substantially advance the literature on incentives
for non-routine tasks. We can study the causal eect of incentives on team performance
as well as on teams’ willingness to explore original solutions in a non-routine analytical
team task in two very distinct samples. First, we conduct a series of eld experiments
with regular teams (customers of our cooperation partner) who are unaware of taking
part in an experiment.3 ese teams had self-selected into the task and were intrinsically
motivated to solve it. Second, we investigate whether our main treatment eects are also
observed in a sample of student participants in which the teams did not self-select into
the task and were exogenously formed.4 Further, by using survey responses from the
student participants, we provide some initial tentative insights on how incentives aect
team organization.
2 Bradler et al. (2014), Charness and Grieco (2014) and Laske and Schroeder (2016) study individual pro-
duction. In Gibbs et al. (2017), team production is potentially possible but submied ideas have fewer than
two authors on average. Similarly, recent studies on the eectiveness of incentives for teachers (Fryer et al.,
2012; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011), who perform at least to some extent a non-routine task, nd
positive eects of performance incentives but it remains unclear if and to what extent complementarities
in individual teacher performance may be regarded as features of joint team production.
3Harrison and List (2004) classify this approach as a “natural eld experiment”. e study was approved
by the Department of Economics’ IRB at LMUMunich (Project 2015-11) and excluded customer teams with
minors. Customers gave wrien consent that their data was to be shared with third parties for research
purposes.
4According to Harrison and List (2004), the student sample can be considered a framed eld experiment
as students are non-standard subjects in the context of real life escape games.
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To identify the eect of providing incentives, we implemented a between-subjects
design, in which teams were randomly allocated to either a treatment condition or a
control condition. For the main treatment, we oered a team bonus if the team completed
the task within 45 minutes (the regular pre-specied upper limit for completing the task
was 60 minutes). In the control condition, no incentives were provided. In both samples,
we nd that bonus incentives signicantly and substantially increased performance in
an objectively quantiable dimension. Teams in the incentive treatment were more than
twice as likely to complete the task within 45 minutes. Moreover, bonus incentives did
not only have a local eect around the threshold for receiving the bonus but improved
the performance over a signicant part of the distribution of nishing times.
We leverage the advantages of our seing to study in depth the most important as-
pects of the incentive scheme for generating the treatment eect. We implemented the
bonus incentive framed either as a gain or a loss, and nd no signicant dierences in
performance between these conditions. In contrast to earlier ndings on bonus incenti-
ves for individually performed tasks (e.g., by Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012),
our results suggest that framing might play a smaller role in non-routine, jointly solved
team tasks. In addition, we implemented two treatments in the customer sample that
allow us to disentangle whether bonus incentives are eective due to the performance
threshold (the reference point) or the reward provided. A treatment inwhichwemade the
bonus threshold (i.e., 45 minutes) a salient reference point without providing incentives
did not aect performance, whereas paying a bonus for completing the task in the regu-
lar pre-specied time of 60 minutes had a signicant positive eect. Hence, the reward
component seems to be key to bringing about the positive treatment eect, as opposed
to merely a salient reference performance.
In order to understand what moderates the main treatment eects, we study die-
rent possible channels. Answers to our ex-post survey of the student sample suggest
that incentives aect team organization in the sense that they promote the emergence of
leadership and lead to a more focused and coordinated approach to solving the problem.
Second, our ndings (for the customer teams, who self-selected into the task) highlight
that introducing incentives does not lead to a strong reduction in a team’s willingness to
explore innovative solutions. However, such discouragement is apparent among student
teams, which were exogenously assigned to the task.
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Our results provide important insights for researchers as well as practitioners in
charge of designing incentive schemes for non-routine analytical team tasks. In parti-
cular, we speak to the pressing question of many practitioners, whether monetary incen-
tives impair team performance in tasks that are non-routine and require creative thin-
king. is idea has recently been strongly promoted in the public, for instance by the
best selling author Pink, in his famous TED talk with more than 19 million views and
his popular book Drive (Pink, 2009, 2011). Our results alleviate most of these concerns,
since we provide novel and robust evidence that bonus incentives are a viable instrument
to increase performance in such tasks. e incentives in our experiment did not reduce
performance but instead aected teams’ outcomes positively across two distinct samples.
Second, we show that it was indeed the reward component of the bonus, and not the re-
ference point of good performance which improved teams’ outcomes. e laer ndings
complement recent research on non-monetary means of increasing performance, in par-
ticular research referring to workers’ awareness of relative performance (for a review
of this literature see Levi and Neckermann, 2014). ird, we add novel and interes-
ting insights to the discussion of whether incentives discourage the exploration of new
approaches. e answer to this question hinges crucially on the characteristics of the
underlying sample. We observe such discouragement only among the student sample,
in which, presumably, less intrinsically motivated teams work on the task. is result
substantially extends recent laboratory ndings by Ederer and Manso (2013), who show
that pay-for-performance schemes can discourage the exploration of new approaches, as
it informs us about when and how incentives may result in unintended consequences.
Finally, we discover a novel and interesting potential channel through which incentives
may improve team performance as student teams facing incentives tended to be more
likely to express a desire for leadership and to report being beer led.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the eld seing
and the experimental design. Section 3 provides the results from both experiments. We
provide a discussion in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Experimental Design
2.1 e Field Setting
We cooperatewith the company ExiteRoom5 (ETR), a provider of real-life escape games.
In these games, teams of players have to solve, in a real seing, a series of tasks that
are cognitively demanding, non-routine, and interactive, in order to succeed (usually by
escaping from a room within a given time limit). Real-life escape games have become
increasingly popular over the last years, and can now be found in almost all major cities
around the globe. Oen, the task is embedded in a story (e.g., to nd a cure for a disease
or to defuse a bomb), which is also reected in the design of the room and how the
information is presented. e task itself consists of a series of quests in which teams
have to nd cues, combine information, and think outside the box. ey make unusual
use of objects, and they exchange and develop innovative and creative ideas to solve the
task they are facing within a given time limit. If a team manages to solve the task before
the alloed time (one hour) expires, they win—if time runs out before the team solves all
quests, the team loses.
Figure 1 ilustrates the idea and the setup of such escape rooms and shows an actual
example from a real-life escape game room. e le panel is an illustration of a typical
room, which contains several items, such as desks, shelves, telephones, books, and so
on. ese items may contain information needed to eventually solve the task. Typically,
not all items will contain helpful information, and part of the task is determining which
item are useful for solving the quests. e right panel shows a picture of participants
actively trying to escape from their room. ey already have opened drawers and closets
to collect potential clues, and now jointly sort, process, and deliberate on how to use the
retrieved information.
To illustrate a typical quest in a real-life escape game, we provide a ctitious example.6
Suppose the participants have found and opened a locked box that contains amegaphone.
Apart from being used as a speaker, the megaphone can also play three distinct types of
alarm sounds. Among the many other items in the room, there is a volume unit (VU)
meter in one corner of the room. To open a padlock on a box containing additional in-
formation, the participants will need a three digit code. e solution to this quest is to
5See https://www.exittheroom.de/munich.
6Our partner ExiteRoom asked us to not present an actual example from their rooms.
6
e le panel shows typical layout of such a room, including items that might provide clues needed for a
successful escape. Source: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-weird-new-world-of-
escape-room-businesses-2015-07-20. e right panel shows a picture of participants actively
searching their room for hints and combining the discovered information. Source: http://boredinva
ncouver.com/listing/escape-game-room-experience-vancouver/.
Figure 1: Examples of real-life escape games
play the three types of alarms on the megaphone and write down the corresponding rea-
dings from the VU meter to obtain the correct combination for the padlock. e teams at
ETR solve quests similar to this ctitious example. e tasks at ETR may further include
nding hidden information in pictures, constructing a ashlight out of several parts, or
identifying and solving rebus (word picture) puzzles (see, also Kachelmaier et al., 2008;
Erat and Gneezy, 2016).
We conducted our experiments at the facilities of ExiteRoom in Munich. e loca-
tion oers three rooms with dierent themes and background stories.7 Teams face a time
limit of 60 minutes and can see the remaining time on a large screen in their room. A
room will be declared as solved if the team manages to escape from the room (or defuse
the bomb) within 60 minutes. If a team does not manage to do so within 60 minutes the
task is declared unsolved and the game ends. If a team gets stuck, they can request hints
via radio from the sta at ETR. As they can only ask for up to ve hints in all, a team
needs to state explicitly that they want to receive a hint. e hints never state the direct
solution to a task, but only provide vague clues regarding the next required step.
7Zombie Apocalypse requires teams to nd the correct mix of liquids before time runs out (the anti-
Zombie potion), in e Bomb, a bomb and a code to defuse it has to be found, and in Madness, teams need
to nd the correct code to open a door so as to escape (ironically) before a mad researcher experiments on
them. For the sake of the reader, in the main text we refrain from presenting the regression specications
with room xed eects. We provide these specications in the Appendix. Adding room xed eects does
not change our results (see Table A.9).
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e seing at ETR reects many aspects of modern non-routine analytical team tasks.
First, nding clues and information very much matches the activity of research that is of-
ten necessary before collaborative team work begins. Second, combining the discovered
information is not trivial, and requires ability for creative problem solving. e subjects
are required to process stimuli in a way that transcends the usual thinking paerns, or
are required to make use of objects in unusual ways. ird, to solve the task, the sub-
jects must eectively cooperate as a team. As in actual work environments, where the
individuals in a team are supposed to provide additional angles on the problem at hand,
dierent approaches to problem solving will enable a team to solve the task more quickly.
Lastly, participants who self-select into the task have a strong motivation to succeed as
they have spent a non-negligible amount of money to perform the task (participants pay
between ¤79 (for two-person groups) and ¤119 (for six-person groups) for a one-hour
game). We interpret the fact that many teams opt to write their names and nishing times
on the walls of the entrance area of ETR as evidence for such a strong motivation. Anot-
her, more objective, reason to solve the task quickly is the fact that at any given point in
time, teams do not know how many quests are le to solve the task in its entirety. at
is, if a team wants to succeed, they have an incentive to succeed quickly.
While these features provide an excellent framework for studying the eect of incen-
tives on team performance, the seing is also extremely exible. e collaboration with
ETR allows implementing dierent incentives for more than 700 teams of customers and
studying whether incentives increase performance also in a sample of presumably less
motivated and exogenously formed teams of student participants. In particular, it aords
a unique opportunity to compare incentive eects for teams who have self-selected into
the task (regular customers) and incentive eects for teams who were confronted with
the task by us, i.e., teams who perform the task as part of their paid participation in an
economic experiment.
2.2 Experimental Treatments and Measures of Performance
We conducted the eld experiment with 3308 customers of ExiteRoom Munich and
implemented a between-subjects design. Our main treatments included 487 teams who
were randomly allocated to either the control condition or a bonus incentive condition.
In the bonus condition, Bonus45 (249 teams), a team received a monetary bonus for the
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team if they managed to solve the task in less than 45 minutes. In the Control condition
(238 teams), teams were not oered any bonus. We framed the bonus either as a gain
(125 teams) or as a loss (124 teams). In Gain45, each team was informed that they would
receive the bonus if they managed to solve the task in less than 45 minutes. In Loss45,
each team received the bonus in cash up front, kept it during their time in the room, and
were informed that they would have to return the money if they did not manage to solve
the task in less than 45 minutes.8
Additionally, we ran two experimental treatments that allow us to test whether bo-
nus incentives were eective because of the monetary benets or because the 45-minute
threshold worked as a salient reference point. In the rst additional treatment (Reference
Point, 147 customer teams), we explicitly mentioned the 45 minutes as a salient reference
point before the team started working on the task, but did not pay any bonus. We said:
“In order for you to judge what constitutes a good performance in terms of remaining
time: if you make it in 45 minutes or less, that is a very good result.” In treatments Gain60
(42 customer teams) and Loss60 (46 customer teams), we provided a monetary bonus but
did not provide the reference point of 45 minutes: teams received the bonus if they solved
the task within 60 minutes.
We collected observable information related to team performance and team characte-
ristics, which include time needed to complete the task, number and timing of requested
hints, team size, gender and age composition of the team9, team language (German or
English), experience with escape games10, and whether the customers came as a private
group or were part of a company team building event. Our primary outcome variable
8e bonus amounted, on average, to approximately ¤10 per team member. Teams in the eld ex-
periments received a bonus of ¤50 (for the entire team of between two and eight members, on average
about ve). To keep the per-person incentives constant in the student sample with three team members
(described below), the student teams received a bonus of ¤30. e treatment intervention (i.e. the bonus
announcement) was always implemented by the experimenter present on site. For that purpose, he or she
announced the possibility of the team’s earning a bonus and had the teams sign a form (see Appendix A.2)
indicating that they understood the conditions for receiving (in Gain45) or keeping (in Loss45) the bonus.
e bonus incentive was described as a special oer and no team questioned that statement. e expe-
rimenter also collected the data. We always made sure that the experimenters blended in with the ETR
sta.
9In order to preserve the natural eld experiment, we did not interfere with the usual procedures of
ETR. us we did not explicitly elicit participants’ ages. Instead, the age of each participant was estimated
based on appearance to be either 1) below 18 years, 2) between 18 and 25 years, 3) between 26 and 35
years, 4) between 36 and 50 years, 5) 51 years or older. Teams with members estimated to be minors were
excluded from the experiment (following the request by the IRB).
10ETR sta ask teams whether they have ever participated in an escape game irrespective of our expe-
riment.
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is team performance, which we measure by i) whether or not teams solved the task in
45 minutes and by ii) the time le upon completing the task. Comparing the incentive
treatments with the control condition allows us to estimate the causal eect of bonus in-
centives on these objective performance measures. e dierence between performance
in Loss45 and Gain45 allows us to determine whether there is an additional benet from
providing incentives in a loss frame. Dierences in performance between Reference Point
and Control reveal whether the reference point of 45 minutes increased the performance
of the teams even if a monetary bonus was absent. e performance inGain60 and Loss60
as compared to Control allows an additional test of whether the monetary component of
the bonus was eective even when there was no change in the reference point as com-
pared to the control.11
Further, we replicated our main treatments (Gain45, Loss45 and Control) in a framed
eld experiment at ExiteRoom in which we randomly allocated student participants
from the subject pool of the social sciences laboratory at the University of Munich (ME-
LESSA) to teams (804 participants in 268 teams). e additional sample allows us to study
whether bonuses aect team performance in similar ways when the team composition
was exogenous and the teams did not themselves choose to perform the non-routine task.
Further, it enables us to collect additional data on task perception and team organization.
2.3 Procedures
2.3.1 Natural Field Experiment (Customer Sample)
We conducted the eld experiment with customers of ExiteRoom during their regular
opening hours from Monday to Friday.12 We implemented the main treatments of the
eld experiment (Gain45, Loss45 and Control) in November and December 2015 and from
January to May 2017. In the second phase of data collection we further ran the additional
treatments Loss60, Gain60 and Reference Point. To ensure that each room entered each
condition with a similar frequency, we randomized on a daily level. is allowed us to
also to avoid treatment spillovers among dierent teams on site (as participants from one
11Note that in Control, roughly 10 percent of the teams solved the task within 45 minutes, whereas
roughly 70 percent did so within 60 minutes. Hence, the treatments which paid a bonus for solving the task
in 60 minutes reveal also whether bonuses worked even if they did not refer to extraordinary performance.
12ExiteRoom oers time slots from Monday through Friday from 3:45 p.m. to 9:45 p.m., and Saturday
and Sunday from 11:15 a.m. to 9:45 p.m., with the dierent rooms shied by 15 minutes to avoid overlaps
and congregations of teams in the hallway.
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slot could potentially encounter participants arriving early for the next slot, and overhear,
e.g. the possibility of earning money). Further, we avoided selection into treatment by
not announcing treatments ex ante and randomly assigning treatments to days aer most
booking slots had already been lled.13
Upon arrival, ExiteRoom sta welcomed teams of customers as usual and custo-
mers signed ETR’s terms and conditions, including ETR’s data privacy policy. en, the
sta explained the rules of the game. Aerwards, the teams were shown to their room
and began solving the task. Teams were not informed that they were taking part in an
experiment. e only dierence between the treatment conditions and the control was
that in the bonus conditions, the bonuses were announced as a special oer to reward
particularly successful teams, while in the reference point treatment, the nishing time
of 45 minutes was mentioned saliently before the team started working on the task.
2.3.2 Framed Field Experiment (Student Sample)
For the framed eld experiment, we invited student participants from the social sciences
laboratory at the University of Munich (MELESSA). Between March and June 2016, and
January and May 2017, a total of 804 participants (268 groups) took part in the experi-
ment. To avoid selection into the sample based on interest in the task, we recruited these
participants using a neutrally framed invitation text that did not explicitly state what
activity participants could expect. e invitation email informed potential participants
that the experiment consisted of two parts, of which only the rst part would be con-
ducted on the premises of MELESSA whereas the second part would take place outside
of the laboratory (without mentioning the escape game). ey were further informed
that their earnings from the rst part would depend on the decisions they made and that
the second part would include an activity with a participation fee that would be cove-
red by the experimenters (as part of participants’ compensation for taking part in the
experiment).14
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants were informed about their upcoming
participation in an escape game. e participants had the option to opt out of the ex-
periment, but no one did so. In the rst part of the experiment, i.e. on the premises of
13All slots in November and December 2015 were fully booked before treatment assignment: according
to the provider, fewer than ve percent of their bookings are made on the day of an event aer the rst
time slot has ended.
14Section A.1 in the Appendix provides a translation of the text of the invitation.
11
MELESSA, we elicited the same control variables as for the customer sample (age, gen-
der, and potential experience with escape games). In addition, the participants took part
in three short experimental tasks and answered several surveys. As the main focus of
this paper is to analyze the robustness of the incentive eects across the two samples,
we relegate the discussion of the results from these additional tasks to another paper.15
Aer completion of the laboratory part, the experimenters guided the participants to
the facilities of ETR which are located a ten-minute walk (0.4 miles / 650 meters) away
from the laboratory. At ETR, each participant was randomly allocated to a team of three
members, received the same explanations from the ETR sta that were given in the eld
experiment, and, depending on the treatment, was informed about the possibility of ear-
ning a bonus. For the student sample, we randomized the treatments on the session level
(stratifying on rooms), as student teams in dierent sessions on a given day could not
talk to each other at the facilities of ETR. During the performance of the task, the same
information about the team performance as in the eld experiment was collected. On
completion of the task, the participants answered questions about the team’s behavior,
organization, and their perception of the task individually, on separate tablet computers.
At the end, we paid the earnings individually in cash. In addition to the participation
fee for ETR, which we covered (given the regular price, this corresponds to roughly¤25
per person), participants earned on average ¤7.53, with payments ranging from ¤3.50
to ¤87.16
3 Results
We organize the presentation of our ndings as follows. We begin our analysis by esta-
blishing the internal validity of our experimental approach. We show that the student
participants perceive the task at ExiteRoom as non-routine and analytical, i.e. involving
15ese tasks included an elicitation of the willingness-to-pay for a voucher of ExiteRoom, an expe-
rimental measure of loss aversion (based on Gächter et al. (2007)) and a word creation task (developed by
Eckartz et al. (2012)). e participants also answered questionnaires regarding creativity (Gough, 1979),
competitiveness (Helmreich and Spence, 1978), status (Mujcic and Frijters, 2013), a big ve inventory (Go-
sling et al., 2003), risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011) and standard demographics. On average, the
subjects spent roughly 30 minutes to complete the experimental tasks and questionnaires.
16In one of the laboratory tasks, the student participants further had the chance to win a voucher for
ETR worth roughly ¤100. Twenty-six participants actually won such a voucher, implying an average
additional earnings from this task of roughly ¤3.23. Adding up all these earnings assuming market prices
as valuations, the participants on average earned an equivalent of ¤35.76 for an experiment lasting two
hours.
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more cognitive eort and creative thinking than easy, routine exercises. en, we ana-
lyze our main research question, whether bonuses improve team performance. As our
ndings are armative, we explore next the channels through which bonus incentives
operate. We disentangle which elements of the bonus (framing, monetary reward, refe-
rence point) are most relevant for bringing about the performance eect and investigate
whether the observed eects of bonuses on performance are robust. We study whether
the eects of bonuses on the teams that self-selected into the task dier from those on
the teams that we confronted with the task, and whether the bonuses aect team organi-
zation. Finally, we highlight how bonus incentives aect a team’s willingness to explore
new approaches, and evaluate whether incentives aect this exploratory behavior die-
rently for teams in the natural versus the framed eld experiment.
3.1 Task Perception and Randomization
We have previously argued that real-life escape games oer the opportunity to study a
class of tasks that is highly relevant to modern workplaces, as teams face a non-routine,
analytical, and interactive challenge that requires thinking outside the box and logical
thinking rather than easy repetitive chores. In order to not interfere with the standard
procedures at ExiteRoom, we could not run extensive surveys and, e.g., ask regular cu-
stomers about their perception of the task. However, we asked the student participants
from the framed eld experiment (N = 804) to what extent they agree that the team
task exhibits various characteristics (using a seven-point Likert scale). Figure 2 shows
the mean answers of our participants. Participants strongly agreed that the task involves
logical thinking, thinking outside the box, and creative thinking, in particular as compa-
red to mathematical thinking and easy exercises (signed-rank tests reject that the ratings
have the same underlying distribution, all p-values < 0.01 except for inking outside
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e gure shows mean answers of N = 804 student participants to eight questions concerning aributes
of the task. Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale.
Figure 2: Task perception
Table 1: Sample size and characteristics
Control (n=238) Bonus45 (pooled) (n=249)
Share males 0.52 (0.29) [0,1] 0.51 (0.29) [0,1]
Group size 4.53 (1.18) [2,7] 4.71 (1.05) [2,8]
Experience 0.48 (0.50) [0,1] 0.48 (0.50) [0,1]
Private 0.69 (0.46) [0,1] 0.63 (0.48) [0,1]
English speaking 0.12 (0.32) [0,1] 0.08 (0.28) [0,1]
Age category ∈ {18-25;26-35;36-50;51+} {0.29;0.45;0.21;0.05} {0.18;0.42;0.33;0.07}∗∗∗
All variables except age category refer to means on the group level. Experience refers to teams that have at least one member
who experienced an escape game before. Private refers to whether a team is composed of private members (1) or whether the
team belongs to a team building event (0). Standard deviations and minimum and maximum values in parentheses; (std.err.)[min,
max]. Age category displays fractions of participants in the respective age category. Stars indicate signicant dierences to Con-
trol (using χ2 tests (for frequencies) and Mann–Whitney tests (for distributions), with * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05 and ***
= p < 0.01.
Table 1 provides an overview of the properties of the sample in the main treatments
of the natural eld experiment with ETR customers. e table highlights that our rand-
omization was successful, based on observables such as the share of males, group size,
experience, whether teams were taking part in a private or company event, and whether
the team was German-speaking.
e only characteristic which diers signicantly across treatments is the distribu-
tion of participants over the age categories guessed by our research assistants (χ2 test,
p-value < 0.01). We therefore provide results from both the regression specications
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without controls and the regression specications in which we control for the estimated
age ranges (and other observables).
3.2 Bonus Incentives and Team Performance
We now turn to our primary research question, whether providing bonus incentives im-
proves team performance. As mentioned earlier, our objective outcome measure of per-
formance is whether teams manage to solve the task within 45 minutes and more gene-
rally how much time teams need to solve the task. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distri-
bution of nishing times with and without bonus incentives in the eld experiment. e
vertical line marks the time limit for the bonus. e gure indicates that bonus incentives
induce teams to complete the task faster and that the positive eect is not only prevalent
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e gure shows the cumulative distributions of nishing times with and without bonus incentives. e
vertical line marks the time limit for the bonus.
Figure 3: Finishing times in Bonus45 and Control in the eld experiment
In Control, only 10 percent of the teams manage to nish the task within 45 minu-
tes whereas in the bonus treatments more than twice as many teams (26.1 percent) do
so (χ2 test, p-value < 0.01). e remaining time upon solving also diers signicantly
between Bonus45 and Control (p-value < 0.01, Mann–Whitney test). In the bonus tre-
atment, teams are on average about three minutes faster than in Control. e positive
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eect of bonuses on performance is also reected in the fraction of teams nishing the
task within 60 minutes. With bonuses, 77 percent of the teams nish the task before the
60 minutes expire, whereas in Control this fraction amounts to only 67 percent (χ2 test,
p-value = 0.01, see also Table 4).
In addition to our non-parametric tests, we provide regression analyses which allow
us to control for observable team characteristics (gender composition of the team, team
size, experience with escape games, private vs. team building, English-speaking, and
the estimated age of team members). Table 2 presents the results from a series of probit
regressions that estimate the probability of solving the task within 45 minutes. To pro-
vide against heteroskedasticity, we employ Huber–White standard errors throughout.
Column (1) includes only a dummy variable for the bonus treatments Bonus45. Bonus
incentives are estimated to increase the probability of solving the task in less than 45
minutes by 16.5 percentage points. In Column (2), we add the observable characteristics
mentioned above (see also Table 1). Here, and in the following analysis, group size and
experience with escape games have a positive eect on performance whereas English
speaking groups perform slightly worse.17 In Column (3) we add xed eects for the ETR
sta members on duty and in Column (4) we add week xed eects. Across all specica-
tions, the coecients of the bonus treatments are positive and highly signicant. Paying
bonuses to teams solving a non-routine task strongly enhances their performance. We
also estimate the eects of bonuses on the time remaining upon solving the task, which
largely conrms both the results from the non-parametric tests on the remaining time
as well as the results from the Probit models in Table 2, although the results are not
statistically signicant in all specications (see Table A.2 in Appendix A.3.2).
We can look in more detail at the eectiveness of incentives depending on time elap-
sed since the beginning of the task. Since the incentive only rewards completing the
task in the rst 45 minutes, it should theoretically lose its eect in the last 15 minutes of
the task. In addition, if incentives crowd out out intrinsic motivation to solve the task,
we should see a decrease in performance aer 45 minutes compared to Control. To test
this hypothesis, we run a Cox proportional hazard model, where we dene the hazard
as completing the task. If our prior was true, we should observe the treatment to have a
17See also Table A.4 in the Appendix. Note further that the treatment eect does not strongly interact
with the observable team characteristics. Only the interaction of incentives and experience (model (4) in
A.4) turns out to be signicantly positive at the ten percent level.
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strong eect on the hazard in the rst 45 minutes, no or even a negative eect in the last
15 minutes, conditional on covariates.
Table 2: Probit regressions (ME) on solved in less than 45 minutes
Probit (ME): Solved in less than 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.188*** 0.151***





Fraction of control teams 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 487
e table displays average marginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the game within 45 minutes on our
treatment indicator (with Control as base category). Control variables added from column (2) onwards include team size, share of
males in a team, a dummy whether someone in the team has been to an escape game before, dummies for median age category
of the team, a dummy whether all group members speak German and a dummy for private teams (opposed to company team
building events). Sta xed eects control for the employees of ExiteRoom present onsite and week xed eects for week of
data collection. All models include the full sample, including weeks that perfectly predict failure to receive the bonus (Table A.1
in section A.3 of the Appendix reports regressions from a sample excluding weeks without variation in the outcome variable).
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
Table 3 shows the hazard ratios using our usual set of controls and employing robust
standard errors. Columns (1) through (3) estimate the eect on the hazard rate for the
rst 45 minutes and columns (4) through (6) on the last 15 minutes. In columns (1) and
(4) we present the baseline eect of the treatment without any covariates. ese are
added in columns (2) and (5) respectively. Columns (3) and (6) also include week and
sta xed eects. e treatment clearly increases the hazard rate of completing the task
in the rst 45 minutes. All coecients are signicantly dierent from 1 and large in
magnitude. Adding controls and xed eects doesn’t change the estimates by much, and
the p-values of the proportional hazard assumption test do not indicate any reason to
doubt our specication. In the last 15 minutes (columns (4) to (6)), however, the eect
has almost completely vanished. e coecient on our treatment switches from far above
one to around one, and is marginally signicant in only one out of three specications.
Again, the proportional hazard assumption cannot be rejected. us our data reects two
important aspects: First, the treatment indeed increases the likelihood of completing the
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task in the rst 45 minutes, but much less so in the last 15 minutes. Second, incentives
are unlikely to crowd out intrinsic motivation in our seing. We conclude:
Result 1 Bonus incentives increase team performance in the non-routine task.
Table 3: Inuence of treatment on hazard rates
Cox Proportional Hazard Model: Finishing the Game
First 45 minutes (1)-(3) Last 15 minutes (4)-(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bonus45 (pooled) 2.853*** 2.947*** 2.914*** 1.178 1.250* 0.841
(0.680) (0.718) (1.371) (0.145) (0.165) (0.214)
p-value for prop. haz. assumption 0.743 0.479 0.447 0.845 0.540 0.631
Control Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes No No Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 487 487
Hazard ratios from a Cox proportional hazard regression of time elapsed until a team has completed the task on our treatment
indicator Bonus45. Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 2. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses,
with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01. Signicant coecients imply that the null hypothesis of equal hazards
(i.e. ratio = 1) can be rejected. e proportional hazard assumption is tested against the null that the relative hazard between the
two treatment groups is constant over time.
3.3 Elements of Bonus Incentives: Framing, Rewards and Refe-
rence Performance
3.3.1 Framing of Bonus Incentives
As explained in the section on the experimental design, for roughly one-half of the te-
ams in Bonus45 we framed the bonus incentives as gains, while the other half faced a loss
frame. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distributions of nishing times separately for both
frames. We nd that the framing of the bonus is of minor importance for team perfor-
mance. A Mann–Whitney test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the nishing times
for the two framings come from the same underlying distribution (p-value = 0.70). Also,
the fractions of teams solving the task within 45 minutes does not dier signicantly (in
Gain45, 24 percent of teams nish within 45 minutes, in Loss45 28 percent of teams do so,
χ2-test, p-value = 0.45). Further, the fraction of teams solving the task in 60 minutes (78
percent in Gain45 and 77 percent in Loss45) does not dier signicantly (χ2-test, p-value
= 0.85) and no statistically signicant dierences are observed for the remaining times
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across frames: In Gain45, teams have on average 36 seconds more le than in Loss45,
and the successful teams in Gain45 have on average 37 seconds more le than in Loss45
(Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.71). Table 4 summarizes these dierent performance
measures. In addition to the non-parametric analyses we report results from a regres-
sion of the probability of solving the task within 45 minutes on a separate dummy for
each framing of the bonus and our control variables in Column (5) of Table 2. Incentives
signicantly increase the probability of solving the task within 45 minutes under both
frames (as compared to the control condition) but a post-estimationWald test shows that
there is no statistically signicant additional impact from framing the bonus as a loss
(p-value= 0.38). We summarize these ndings in Result 2.
Result 2 Framing the bonus as a loss has no signicant additional advantage over framing
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e gure shows the cumulative distribution of nishing times with bonus incentives framed as either
gains, losses, or without bonuses. e vertical line marks the time limit for the bonus.
Figure 4: Finishing times in bonus treatments (disaggregated) and Control in the eld
experiment
3.3.2 Reference Points vs. Monetary Rewards
To understand whether bonus incentives work due to the monetary reward or due to the
fact that the bonus also created a salient reference point at the 45-minute mark, we con-
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Table 4: Task performance with and without bonus incentives
Control Bonus45 (pooled) Gain45 Loss45
fraction of teams solving task in 45 mins 0.10 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
fraction of teams solving task in 60 mins 0.67 0.77∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.77∗
mean remaining time (in sec) 345 530∗∗∗ 548∗∗∗ 512∗∗∗
mean remaining time (in sec) if solved 515 688∗∗∗ 707∗∗∗ 669∗∗∗
is table summarizes key variables and their dierences across our three treatments Control, Gain45, and Loss45 and the pooled
bonus incentive treatments. Stars indicate signicant dierences fromControl (using Fisher’s exact test for frequencies andMann–
Whitney tests for distributions), with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
ducted two additional treatments. In Reference Point we introduce the 45-minute thres-
hold as a salient reference point but do not pay a reward. In Bonus60 we pay a bonus
(again framed as a gain or a loss) for solving the task in 60 minutes.18 Figure 5 shows
the cumulative distribution of nishing times in Control, Reference Point, Bonus60 and
Bonus45 and indicates that monetary rewards reduce the amount of time teams need to
nish the task (Bonus60 vs. Control, Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.05; Bonus45 vs.
Control, Mann–Whitney test, p-value < 0.01, with Bonus45 vs. Bonus60, Mann–Whitney
test, p-value = 0.24), whereas the cumulative distribution of remaining times in Refe-
rence Point almost perfectly overlaps with the cumulative distribution function in Con-
trol (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.78). Hence, this is strong evidence that it is not
the provision of a salient reference performance, but rather the reward component of the
bonus incentives which generates the performance increase.
Lastly, we provide a regression analysis for the full sample in Table 5. We regress the
probability of nishing within 45 minutes on the three treatment indicators Reference
Point, Bonus60 and Bonus45. Column (1) includes only the treatment dummies. In Co-
lumn (2), we add our set of control variables. In Column (3) we add sta xed eects
and in Column (4) we add week xed eects. e regressions show that monetary incen-
tives signicantly increase the probability of nishing within 45 minutes, whereas the
reference treatment does not.19 It also becomes apparent that this nding is robust to
the addition of covariates and xed eects. Moreover, a post-estimationWald test rejects
the equality of coecients of Bonus60 and Reference Point in all specications controlling
for covariates (models (2) to (4), p-values<0.1) but fails to reject equality of coecients
18Wedo not dierentiate between the gain and the loss frame of Bonus60 in the following. As for Bonus45,
no dierence between the frames emerged.
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e gure shows the cumulative distribution of nishing times of all bonus treatments (45 minutes and
60 minutes pooled each), Reference Point and Control. e vertical line marks the time limit for the
Bonus45 condition.
Figure 5: Finishing times for all treatments in the eld experiment
at conventional levels of statistical signicance (p-value=0.11) for model (1), which in-
cludes no covariates. Similarly, the coecient of Bonus45 is signicantly larger than the
coecient of Reference Point (at the 1 percent level) except for the specication in column
(4) (p-value=0.14). Equality of coecients of Bonus60 and Bonus45 can never be rejected.
We summarize this nding in Result 3:
Result 3 Bonuses increase performance due to the monetary reward they provide. Introdu-
cing a salient reference performance (indicating extraordinary performance) is not sucient
to induce a performance shi.
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Table 5: Probit regressions (ME) on solved in less than 45 minutes (all treatments)
Probit (ME): Solved in less than 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.164*** 0.108**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.047)
Bonus60 (pooled) 0.105** 0.102** 0.105** 0.127**
(0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.059)
Reference Point 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.020
(0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.052)
Fraction of control teams 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes
Observations 722 722 722 722
e table shows averagemarginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the task within 45minutes on our treat-
ment indicators Bonus45, Bonus60 and Reference Point with Control being the base category. Control variables, sta and week xed
eects as in Table 2. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
3.4 Robustness of the Bonus Incentive Eect: Results from the
Framed Field Experiment
We have shown that bonus incentives increase performance in our non-routine team task
in a sample of self-selected and motivated teams of ETR customers. To test whether the
performance enhancing eect of bonus incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks is
also present in demographics other than the self-selected ETR customer sample, we repe-
ated our main treatments in a student sample. Student participants may react dierently
to bonus incentives than the teams from our natural eld experiment for several reasons.
Most importantly, the process by which the sample is drawn is dierent across the two
experiments. While regular teams of ExiteRoom customers self-select into the task and
are likely to be intrinsically motivated to perform well (as they pay for it), student teams
from the laboratory subject pool are confronted by us with the task, do not pay for it,
and hence are less likely to be intrinsically motivated to solve the task. Teams in the eld
experiment are also formed endogenously and vary in size, whereas we randomly as-
22
sign students to teams of three participants. Finally, our student participants dier along
several observable dimensions, such as age, gender and experience with the task.20
In all, we randomized 268 teams of three students into the treatments Control (88),
Gain45 (90) and Loss45 (90). Despite the assignment to the treatment being random and
balanced across weeks, there are on average fewer males in Gain45 (0.39) than in Control
(0.46) (Mann–Whitney test, Gain45 vs. Control, p-value = 0.08) or Loss45 (0.47) (Mann–
Whitney test, Loss45 vs. Control p-value = 0.10, Loss45 vs. Gain45, p-value = 0.97),
and the share of teams with at least one team member with experience in escape games
is higher in Loss45 (0.42) than in Gain45 (0.29) (χ2− test, p-value = 0.06). Age does not
signicantly dier by treatment (Mann–Whitney test, Gain45 vs. Control p-value = 0.47,
Loss45 vs. Control, p-value = 0.92 and Loss45 vs. Control, p-value = 0.38 ). Although the
dierences between treatments are not very pronounced, we will nevertheless control
for these dierences in our regression analyses.
Analogously to the analysis in the customer sample, we study treatment eects on
team performance by analyzing the fraction of the teams solving the task in 45 minutes,
and 60minutes respectively, as well as the remaining times of teams in general and among
successful teams. Figure 6 shows the performance of teams in the framed eld experiment
and is the student sample analogue to Figure 3. While student teams perform worse
on average than the ETR customer teams, the bonus incentives turn out to be similarly
eective for the student teams.
Again, the fraction of teams nishing within 45 minutes is more than twice as high
when teams face bonus incentives. In the incentive treatments, 11 percent of teams ma-
nage to solve the task within 45 minutes whereas only 5 percent do so in Control (χ2-test,
p-value = 0.08). e fraction of teams nishing the task within 60 minutes is also signi-
cantly larger under bonus incentives. With bonuses, 60 percent of the teams nish the
task before the 60 minutes expire whereas in Control this fraction amounts to 48 percent
(χ2-test, p-value = 0.06). Further, with bonus incentives teams are on average about
three minutes faster than in Control, and Mann–Whitney tests reject that nishing times
in the control condition come from the same underlying distribution as nishing times
under bonus incentives (Mann–Whitney test, p-values< 0.01). Table 6 summarizes these
ndings.
20e students are on average younger (23.03), slightly less likely to be male (44 percent) and less ex-
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e gure shows the cumulative distributions of nishing times. e vertical line at 45 minutes marks
the time limit for the bonus.
Figure 6: Finishing times across treatments in the framed eld experiment (student sam-
ple)
In addition to the non-parametric tests, we run regressions analogously to the ana-
lyses for the customer sample. As before, we control for the share of males in a team,
average age and experience with escape games.21 Table 7 reports the results from Probit
regressions on the probability of solving the task within 45minutes. Column (1) only uses
the treatment dummy and shows that bonus incentives signicantly increase the proba-
bility of solving the task in 45 minutes. e positive eects of the bonus incentives are
robust to controlling for background characteristics (Column (2)), for sta xed eects
(Column (3)), and week xed eects (Column (4)). Overall, the Probit regression results
reinforce our non-parametric ndings. Oering bonuses increases team performance.
Running a regression separately for gain and loss frames yields qualitatively very similar
results (Column (5)), as the coecients for Loss45 and Gain45 are again both positive.
However, only the coecient for the gain frame turns out to be statistically signicant.
A post-estimation Wald test cannot reject equivalence for the coecients of Gain45 and
Loss45 at the ten percent level. Also for the student sample, the positive eect of bonus
21In contrast to the ETR customer sample all teams speak German and consist of three team members.
Hence, we do not need to control for language or group size.
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incentives is reected qualitatively in the analyses of the time remaining (see Table A.6
in Appendix A.4).
Table 6: Task performance with and without bonus incentives (student sample)
Control Bonus45 (pooled) Gain45 Loss45
fraction of teams solving task in 45 mins 0.05 0.11∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.09
fraction of teams solving task in 60 mins 0.48 0.60∗ 0.54 0.66∗∗
mean remaining time (in sec) 169.90 327.97∗∗∗ 321.28∗ 334.67∗∗∗
mean remaining time (in sec) if solved 355.98 546.62∗∗∗ 590.10∗∗ 510.50∗∗∗
is table summarizes key variables and their dierences across our three treatments Control, Gain45 and Loss45, as well as the
combined Bonus45 (pooled). Stars indicate signicant dierences from Control (using χ2 test for frequencies and Mann–Whitney
tests for distributions), with * = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05 and *** = p < 0.01. P-values of non-parametric comparisons between
Gain45 and Loss45 exceed 0.10 for all four performance measures.
Table 7: Probit regressions (ME) on solved in less than 45 minutes (student sample)
Probit (ME): Solved in less than 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.075* 0.073* 0.075* 0.079**





Fraction of control teams 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 268 268 268 268 268
e table shows average marginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the game within 45 minutes on our
treatment indicator (with Control as base category). Control variables added from column (2) onwards include share of males in a
team, a dummy whether someone in the team has been to an escape game before and average age of the team. Sta xed eects
control for the employees of ExiteRoom present onsite and week xed eects control for week of data collection. All models in-
clude the full sample, including weeks that perfectly predict failure to receive the bonus (Table A.5 in section A.3 of the Appendix
reports regressions from a sample excluding weeks without variation in the outcome variable). Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses, with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
3.5 Performance and Team Organization
In addition to establishing the robustness of the positive incentive eect, our student
sample allows us to explore whether bonus incentives also aect team motivation and
organization. We conducted two post-experimental questionnaires to analyze potential
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mechanisms through which the treatment eect could operate. In estionnaire 1, we
asked our student participants to agree or disagree (on a seven-point Likert scale) with
a number of statements that might capture aspects of team motivation and organization.
In estionnaire 2 (which was conducted for a subsample of 375 participants), we use
an additional set of questions based on the concept of team work quality by Hoegl and
Gemuenden (2001). Table 8 reports the results from estionnaires 1 and 2.
e upper panel of Table 8 shows that incentives in general do not strongly aect
agreement with the statements we provided but reveals some interesting insights, about
through which channels incentives might potentially operate. First, teams appear to be
notably more stressed when facing incentives than were the teams in the control (Mann–
Whitney test, p-value = 0.01). At the same time, similar to teams in Control, treated
teams strongly agree with the statement “I would like to participate in a similar task
again” (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.88), suggesting that incentives caused posi-
tive rather than negative stress among the team members. Second, participants in the
incentive treatment are more likely to report that one team member was dominant in le-
ading the team (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.03), and also agree signicantly more
with the statement “I was dominant in leading the team” (Mann–Whitney test, p-value
= 0.05). Additionally, we observe several dierences in items relating to a more focused
and directed approach within a team (although some of them fail to be statistically signi-
cant at the 10 percent level): With bonus incentives, participants tend to agree less with
the statements “We wrote down all numbers we found.” (Mann–Whitney test, p-value
= 0.04), “We exchanged many ideas in the team.” (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.12)
and “When we got stuck we let as many team members try as possible.” (Mann–Whitney
test, p-value = 0.14).
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“e team was very stressed.” 3.57 4.13∗∗∗ 0.00
“One person was dominant in leading the team.” 2.60 2.86∗∗ 0.03
“We wrote down all numbers we found.” 5.64 5.50∗∗ 0.04
“I was dominant in leading the team.” 2.64 2.87∗∗ 0.05
“We rst searched for clues before combining them.” 4.58 4.39 0.11
“We exchanged many ideas in the team.” 5.87 5.74 0.12
“When we got stuck we let as many 5.43 5.28 0.14
team members try as possible.”
“e team was very motivated.” 6.14 6.26 0.22
“We communicated a lot.” 5.78 5.88 0.23
“All team members exerted eort.” 6.23 6.37 0.24
“Our notes were helpful in nding the solution.” 5.50 5.43 0.41
“I was able to present all my ideas to the group.” 5.95 5.93 0.41
“We were well coordinated in the group.” 5.73 5.80 0.61
“I was too concentrated on my own part.” 2.88 2.83 0.76
“We made our decisions collectively.” 5.51 5.58 0.87
“I would like to perform a similar task again.” 6.30 6.28 0.88
“Our individual skills complemented well.” 5.65 5.68 0.89
“e mood in our team was good.” 6.30 6.36 0.93
“All team members contributed equally.” 5.97 6.00 0.96
estionnaire 2 (n=375)
“How much did you wish somebody would take the lead?” 2.67 3.32∗∗∗ 0.00
“How well led was the team?” 3.85 4.21∗∗ 0.04
“How much did you think about the problems?” 6.00 5.79 0.11
“How much did you follow ideas that were not promising?” 5.02 4.79 0.17
“How much team spirit evolved?” 5.54 5.80 0.17
“How much coordination was there 3.28 3.51 0.18
of individual tasks and joint strategy?”
“How much exploitation was there of individual potential?” 5.14 4.94 0.22
“How much helping was there when somebody stuck?” 5.70 5.58 0.22
“How much did you search the room for solutions?” 6.31 6.22 0.51
“How much exertion of eort was there by all the members?” 5.98 5.96 0.60
“How much communication was there about procedures?” 5.30 5.35 0.88
“How much was there of accepting the help of others?” 5.80 5.85 0.89
is table reports answers to our post-experiment questionnaires from the framed eld experiment by treatment (Control and Bo-
nus45), and p-values of the dierences between the treatments. e scale ranges from not at all agreeing to the statement (=1)
to completely agreeing (=7) in estionnaire 1 and from very lile (=1) to very much (=7) in estionnaire 2. Stars indicate
signicant dierences from Control using Mann-Whitney tests, with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
eresults fromestionnaire 2 in the lower panel of Table 8mirror the answers from
estionnaire 1. Teams facing incentives report more demand for leadership (Mann–
Whitney test, p-value < 0.01), while they also report that teams were beer led (Mann–
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Whitney test, p-value= 0.04). Further, also in estionnaire 2 we observe several ten-
dencies suggesting a potentially more focused and directed approach within the teams
under incentives. Teams tend to be less likely to spend a long time thinking about pro-
blems (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.11) and tend to follow ideas that were not pro-
mising less frequently (Mann–Whitney test, p-value = 0.17) . Also, teams facing bonus
incentives tend to be more likely to report an emergence of team spirit (Mann–Whitney
test, p-value = 0.17) and the coordination of individual tasks and joint strategy (Mann–
Whitney test, p-value = 0.18). Although these statistically insignicant results can serve
as suggestive evidence only, we nonetheless believe that they highlight a potentially rele-
vant channel through which bonus incentives for teams may increase performance: with
an incentive, teams demand more leadership, individual team members are more likely
to take the initiative and teams become more focused and beer coordinated.
3.6 Bonus Incentives and the Willingness to Explore
e eectiveness of bonus incentives in the long run depends on whether monetary in-
centives crowd out intrinsic motivation, thereby inhibiting creativity and innovation. In
fact, previous research has suggested that performance-based nancial incentives may
do just that, and thereby aect workers’ willingness to explore in an experimentation
task (see, e.g., Ederer and Manso, 2013). Our setup allows us to shed light on whether
such behavioral reactions are also present in the context of non-routine analytical team
tasks. We interpret the request for external help (hint taking) as a proxy for a team’s un-
willingness to explore on their own, and thus analyze how many out of the ve possible
hints teams request under the dierent treatment conditions, as well as whether they are
more likely to take hints earlier in the presence of incentives.
Table 9 shows the number of hints taken across samples and treatments. For teams
who self-selected into the task (customer sample), we do not nd a statistically signicant
dierence in the number of hints taken within 60 minutes. ese teams take on average
about three hints in both the bonus treatment and the control condition. In contrast, for
teams confronted by us with the task (the student sample), we observe (economically
and statistically) signicantly more hint taking in the bonus treatments than in Control,
suggesting that incentives reduce these student teams’ willingness to explore original
solutions. To capture potential heterogeneity across teams, we report the fractions of
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teams requesting 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 hints for the customer sample in panel (a) and for the
student sample in panel (b) of Figure 7. e gure reinforces our earlier ndings: bonus
incentives have, if at all, a minor eect on the number of hints taken in the customer
sample. ese teams’ willingness to explore original solutions fails to dier statistically
signicantly across treatments (χ2-test, p-value=0.114). Panel (b) of Figure 7 depicts the
same histogram for the framed eld experiment with student participants. It becomes
apparent that teams who did not self-select into the task are much more likely to take
hints when facing incentives (χ2-test, p-value=0.029). Roughly 75 percent of these teams
take four or ve hints when facing incentives, as compared to 59 percent doing so in
Control. Regression analyses on hint taking (including additional controls, see Table 10,
models (1), (2), (5), and (6)) conrm these results.22
Table 9: Hints requested in the eld experiment and the framed eld experiment
Control Bonus45 (pooled) Gain45 Loss45
within 60 minutes
Field Experiment (487 groups) 2.92 (1.55) 3.10 (1.34) 3.05(1.40) 3.15(1.29)
Framed Field Experiment (268 groups) 3.74(1.04) 4.11(0.98)∗∗∗ 4.10(0.98)∗∗ 4.12(0.98)∗∗
within 45 minutes
Field Experiment (487 groups) 1.97 (1.22) 2.36 (1.15)∗∗∗ 2.30(1.1.19)∗∗ 2.41(1.10)∗∗∗
Framed Field Experiment (268 groups) 2.33(0.93) 3.17(1.04)∗∗∗ 3.07(1.04)∗∗∗ 3.28(1.04)∗∗∗
is table summarizes mean number of hints taken across treatments in the eld experiment and the framed eld experi-
ment (standard deviations in parentheses). Stars indicate signicant dierences from Control (using Mann–Whitney tests), with
∗
= p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01. p-values of non-parametric comparisons between Gain45 and Loss45 are
larger than 0.10 for both the eld experiment and the framed eld experiment.
Focusing only on hints taken within the rst 45 minutes, non-parametric tests indi-
cate signicant dierences across treatments for both samples, but again, the eect is
much stronger for student teams who were confronted by us with the non-routine task.
Regression analysis implies that these teams take on average 0.84 more hints within the
rst 45 minutes when facing incentives, whereas customer teams take on average only
0.39 more hints (columns (3) and (7) of Table 10). When we add additional controls and
xed eects (columns (4) and (7) of Table 10), the results for the student sample remain
unchanged, whereas the positive coecient of the incentive condition becomes statisti-
cally insignicant in the customer sample.
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(b) Student Sample (268 groups)
e gure shows histograms of hints taken across samples. Panel
(a) depicts the fractions of customer teams choosing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or
5 hints in Control (le graph) and Bonus45 (right graph). Panel (b)
shows the fractions for student teams.
Figure 7: Hints requested across samples and treatments
Table 10: Number of hints requested
OLS: Number of hints requested
Field experiment (1)-(4) Framed Field Experiment (5)-(8)
within 60 minutes within 45 minutes within 60 minutes within 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.172 0.098 0.387*** 0.186 0.372*** 0.343*** 0.843*** 0.808***
(0.132) (0.221) (0.107) (0.192) (0.133) (0.131) (0.126) (0.125)
Constant 2.924*** 4.037 1.971*** 1.770 3.739*** 5.449*** 2.330*** 4.236***
(0.100) (0.645) (0.079) (1.080) (0.523) (1.032) (0.099) (0.708)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Week Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 268 268 268 268
Coecients from OLS regressions of the number of hints requested within 60 minutes or 45 minutes regressed on our treatment
indicator Bonus45. Controls and xed eects identical to previous tables. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and
∗
= p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01. 30
Taken together our results are in line with the conclusion that intrinsic motivation
and incentives interact in an interesting way when teams can choose whether or not to
explore original and innovative solutions on their own. Customer teams who themselves
chose to perform a task are presumably more intrinsically motivated to work on the task,
and thus less likely to seek external help—even when facing performance incentives. In
contrast, incentives strongly reduce the willingness to explore original solutions of teams
that did not self-select into the task. While we are aware that the two samples dier
along several other dimensions (such as exogenous versus endogenous team formation,
age or educational background), it is less clear to what extent these other dierences
(as compared to dierences in intrinsic motivation) are likely candidates to explain the
dierential reactions to incentives across samples. We summarize our ndings in Result 4.
Result 4 Bonus incentives reduce student teams’ exploration behavior but aect explora-
tion behavior of customer teams (if at all) to a much smaller extent.
4 Discussion
Our results demonstrate that bonus eects have sizable eects on team performance. Im-
portantly, these eects are present throughout all our incentive treatments, and emerge
in both the natural and the framed eld experiments. e performance-stimulating eect
of incentives therefore seems to be ubiquitous in the non-routine analytical team task in
our seing, and not simply driven by a specic choice of subjects or certain treatment
parameters. e same holds for the absence of framing eects that we also observe across
all treatments and samples, suggesting that framing may be specic to the environment.
is is consistent with much of the literature where signicant framing eects have been
observed in some environments (e.g. Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011; Fryer et al.,
2012; Hossain and List, 2012), but not in others (DellaVigna and Pope, 2017).
Further, we nd that bonus incentives do not lead to strong performance decreases if
teams fail to meet the time limit to receive the bonus. Instead, the proportional hazard
model analysis suggests that incentives (if anything) increase the likelihood of solving
the task within 60 minutes even if teams do not meet the bonus threshold of 45 minutes.
Teams facing incentives (for solving the task in 45 minutes) that eventually do not obtain
the bonus perform at least as well as teams not facing incentives that do not solve the task
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in 45 minutes. is is particularly striking as the former are presumably more (adversely)
self-selected, as the incentive eect presumably boosts some relatively good teams who
would have barely missed the cuto without incentives.
But what is driving the observed performance increase? With respect to hint-taking
behavior, we have several reasons to believe that changes in hint-taking are not respon-
sible for the observed performance eects. First, an increase in performance will mecha-
nically make subjects request hints earlier, as they reach dicult stages earlier. Second,
in our natural eld experiment, overall hint-taking behavior is not signicantly dierent
across treatments. ird, when studying at what point in time teams achieve an interme-
diate step early in the game and how many hints teams have taken before that step, we
observe signicantly beer performance by teams facing incentives but no signicant
dierences in hint taking (see Table A.7 in Appendix A.5).
An alternative possible explanation for how bonuses improve performance is that in-
centives may enhance learning about the essentials of the production function, i.e. how
combinations of dierent kinds of eort (e.g. searching, deliberating, combining infor-
mation) map to performance. While we primarily designed our experiment with the goal
of causally identifying the eect of bonus incentives, the richness of our data also allows
us to shed some light on the importance of learning. We expect teams with prior expe-
rience in escape games to have acquired more knowledge on how combinations of die-
rent kinds of eort map to performance. Hence, if incentives increase performance due
to learning, incentives should in particular increase the performance of inexperienced te-
ams. However, we observe that, if at all, incentives have a stronger eect on performance
of teams with prior experience (see model (4) in Table A.4), suggesting that incentives
do not increase performance because of this kind of learning. While both hint-taking
and learning seem unlikely to be responsible for the performance increase, we provide
suggestive evidence that teams facing incentives are more likely to wish for a leader and
that leaders appear to emerge endogenously when teams face incentives. is renders




According to Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Price (2013), non-routine, cognitively de-
manding, interactive tasks are becoming more and more important in the economy. At
the same time we know relatively lile about how incentives aect performance in these
tasks. We provide a comprehensive analysis of incentive eects in a non-routine, cogni-
tively demanding, team task in a large scale eld experiment that allows us to study the
causal eect of bonus incentives on the performance and exploratory behavior of teams.
Together with our collaboration partner, we were able to implement a natural eld ex-
periment with more than 700 teams and to replicate our main ndings in an additional
student sample of more than 250 teams. We nd an economically and statistically signi-
cant positive eect of incentives on performance. Teams in both samples are more than
twice as likely to solve the task in 45 minutes under the incentive condition than under
the control condition, and we observe a positive performance eect not only around the
bonus threshold, but for a signicant part of the distribution of nishing times.
By exploiting a number of additional treatment variations in our natural eld experi-
ment, we shed more light on the drivers and moderators of the treatment eect. First, we
implement the bonus incentives both in a gain and in a loss frame and nd that framing
team bonuses as a loss does not yield an additional performance increase as compared
to framing bonuses as gains. Second, we complement the recent literature on how the
provision of information about individuals’ relative performance aects behavior. When
providing teams with a reference point of good performance in an experimental treat-
ment without monetary incentives, teams’ nishing times do not improve compared to
those in the control condition. Hence, the explicit incentives seem to be key to bringing
about the positive treatment eect in our experiment. ird, we nd that teams tend to
be less likely to explore on their own when facing bonus incentives, but this was mostly
for those teams that were mandated to perform the task. ese ndings extend earlier
work on the (negative) relationship between incentives and the exploration of new ap-
proaches (Ederer and Manso, 2013), by highlighting a potential relationship between the
consequences of incentives for exploratory behavior and the intrinsic motivation to solve
a task. e fact that incentives do not always crowd out intrinsic motivation also com-
plements recent evidence on incentive eects in meaningful routine tasks (Kosfeld et al.,
2017). Finally, answers to our ex-post survey tentatively suggest that incentives may lead
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to the emergence of leadership within teams in non-routine team tasks and may result
in more focused approaches to work.
Our study constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the rst systematic investigation
into incentive eects in non-routine analytical team tasks. e results raise interesting
questions for future research. For instance, it may be promising to study explicitly how
team performance in non-routine tasks changes when leadership is exogenously assigned
as compared to endogenously determined. As our ndings only provide an initial glimpse
at the incentive eects in these kinds of tasks, systematically varying incentive structures
within teams could create additional insights into the functioning of non-routine team
work. Looking beyond the question of incentives, the seing of a real-life escape game
may be used to study other important questions such as goal seing, non-monetary re-
wards and recognition, the eects of team composition, team organization, and team
motivation. Studies in this seing are in principle easily replicable, many treatment va-
riations are implementable, and large sample sizes are feasible.
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Friebel, G., Heinz, M., Krüger, M., and Zubanov, N. (2017). Team incentives and perfor-
mance: Evidence from a retail chain. American Economic Review, 107(8):2168–2203.
Fryer, R., Levi, S., List, J., and Sado, S. (2012). Enhancing the ecacy of teacher incen-
tives through loss aversion: A eld experiment. Working Paper.
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A.1 Text of the Invitation to Laboratory Participants
We added the following paragraph to the standard invitation to student participants in
the framed eld experiment:
“Notice: is experiment consists of two parts, of which only the rst part will be
conducted on the premises of the MELESSA laboratory. In Part 1 you will be paid for
the decisions you make. Part 2 will take place outside of the laboratory. You will take
part in an activity with a participation fee. Your compensation in Part 2 will be that the
experimenters will pay the participation fee of the activity for you.”
A.2 Treatment Form for Bonus Treatments
Bonus treatment teams had to sign the following form, indicating understanding of the
treatment procedures. For teams in the loss frame, the form further included the obli-
gation to give back the money in case the team did not qualify for the bonus. Only one
member of each team signed the form and the forms diered between the customer and
student sample only in the amount of the bonus mentioned (¤50 for the customer sam-
ple and ¤30 for the student sample). Similarly, the forms of Bonus45 and Bonus60 only
diered in the time set for receiving the bonus.
e form for Gain45 said:
“As usual, you have one hour in total to escapre from the room. Furthermore, we
have a special oer for you today: if you escape from the room within 45 minutes, you
will receive ¤50.”
e form for Loss45 said:
“As usual, you have one hour in total to escape from the room. Furthermore, we have
a special oer for you today: You now receive ¤50. If you do not escape from the room
within 45 minutes, you will lose the ¤50.”
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A.3 Additional Analyses for the Field Experiment
A.3.1 Probability of Solving the Game in 45 Minutes (Field Experiment)
Table A.1 reports the results for the regression columns (1) to (5) from Table 2 excluding
those weeks where we do not observe variation in the outcome variable; it conrms our
previous ndings.
Table A.1: Probit regressions: Excluding weeks with no variation in the outcome variable
Probit: Solved in less than 45 minutes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.183*** 0.163**





Fraction of control teams 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 451 451 451 451 451
e table reports average marginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the game within 45 minutes on our
treatment indicator (with Control as base category). Control variables, sta andweek xed eects as in Table 2. All models exclude
weeks that perfectly predict failure to receive the bonus. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, with ∗ = p < 0.10,
∗∗
= p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
A.3.2 Regression Analysis for Remaining Time as Dependent Variable (Field
Experiment)
We also estimate the eects of bonuses on the remaining time in seconds. Because our
outcome measure is strongly right skewed and contains many zeroes (as there is no time
le for those not nishing the task at all), we estimate a GLM regression with a log link,
again employing heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Table A.2). Column (1) starts
out with our baseline specication which includes a dummy for the incentive treatments
(pooled) only. Bonus incentives signicantly increase performance (measured by the
remaining time). Analogously to our analysis in Table 2, we add the set of observable
controls in Column (2). In Column (3) we add sta xed eects. In Column (4) we present
the results from an estimation that also includes week xed eects. In this model the
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coecient is still positive but fails to be statistically signicant at conventional levels (p-
value=0.14). Finally, in Column (5) we include two treatment dummies to test whether
gain or loss frames aect performance dierently. Both coecients are of similar size but
fail to be statistically signicant at conventional levels (for Gain45, p-value=0.19 and for
Loss45,(p-value=0.17). Further, we cannot reject the equality of the coecients for the
Loss45 and Gain45 treatments (Wald test, p-value=0.99).
Table A.2: GLM regressions: Bonus incentives and remaining time
GLM: Remaining time in seconds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.432*** 0.447*** 0.406*** 0.257





Constant 5.842*** 4.041*** 4.251*** 3.803*** 3.803***
(0.079) (0.355) (0.404) (0.482) (0.481)
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 487
Coecients from a generalized linear model regression with a log link of the remaining time on our treatment indicators (with
Control as base category). Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 2. Robust standard errors reported in parent-
heses, and ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
Analogously to the Probit regressions reported in Table 5, we also run GLM speci-
cations with the remaining time as the dependent variable (Table A.3) for the full set
of treatments; this conrms our ndings that incentives that include rewards increase
performance whereas only mentioning the reference performance does not.
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Table A.3: GLM regressions: Bonus incentives, references points and remaining time
GLM: Remaining time (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bonus (pooled, 45 min) 0.432*** 0.436*** 0.376*** 0.244
(0.100) (0.097) (0.106) (0.150)
Bonus (pooled, 60 min) 0.233* 0.267** 0.392*** 0.449**
(0.135) (0.120) (0.127) (0.185)
Reference Point (45 min) 0.002 -0.001 0.102 0.131
(0.123) (0.118) (0.128) (0.149)
Constant 5.842*** 4.044*** 4.225*** 3.713***
(0.079) (0.296) (0.342) (0.417)
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes
Observations 722 722 722 722
Coecients from a generalized linear model regression with a log link of the remaining time on our treatment indicators (with
Control being the base category). Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 2. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses, and ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
A.3.3 Bonus incentives and team characteristics
Table A.4 shows the results from linear probability models estimating a dummy for whet-
her teams solve the task within 45 minutes. Model (1) includes no interactions and uses
the same variables and xed eects as model (4) in Table 2. e eect of bonus incenti-
ves is of a similar magnitude as the average marginal eect in the Probit specication. In
models (2) to (6) we add interactions with observable team characteristics. e ndings
from these models suggest that the treatment eect does not strongly interact with the
observable team characteristics. Only the interaction of incentives and experience model
(4) turns out to be signicant (at the ten percent level) and positive, while at the same
time the treatment dummy is still statistically signicant and of large magnitude. Hence,
the positive incentive eect is robust and slightly larger for teams with experience.
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Table A.4: Linear Probability model: Bonus incentives and the probability of solving the
task in 45 minutes or less
OLS: Finishing in less than 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.172*** 0.200** 0.023 0.120* 0.130* 0.169***
(0.061) (0.086) (0.162) (0.064) (0.076) (0.064)
Share males 0.102* 0.130** 0.102* 0.100* 0.105* 0.103*
(0.058) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
Group size 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.042** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Experience 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.058 0.124*** 0.125***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
Private 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.036 -0.001 0.039
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045)
English -0.115** -0.117** -0.113* -0.114** -0.117** -0.129***
speaking (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.045)
Bonus45 (pooled) …
… × Share males -0.055
(0.114)
… × Group size 0.031
(0.032)
… × Experience 0.132*
(0.072)
… × Private 0.077
(0.079)
… × English 0.027
speaking (0.112)
Constant -0.177 -0.192 -0.109 -0.179 -0.163 -0.172
(0.151) (0.151) (0.160) (0.151) (0.149) (0.152)
R-squared 0.155 0.156 0.157 0.162 0.157 0.156
Sta Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 487 487
Coecients from a linear probability model . Dependent variable: Dummy for nishing within 45 minutes. All models include
sta and week xed eects as in Table 7. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and
∗∗∗
= p < 0.01.
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A.4 Additional Analyses for the Framed Field Experiment
A.4.1 Probability of Solving theGame in 45Minutes (Framed Field Experiment)
Table A.5 reports the results for the regression columns (1) to (5) from Table 7 excluding
those weeks where we do not observe variation in the outcome variable; it conrms our
previous ndings.
Table A.5: Probit regressions (ME): Excluding weeks with no variation in the outcome
variable
Probit: Solved in less than 45 minutes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.107* 0.097* 0.104* 0.111**





Fraction of control teams 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
Table reports average average marginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the game within 45 minutes on
our treatment indicator (with Control as base category). Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 7. All models
exclude weeks that perfectly predict failure to receive the bonus. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, with ∗ = p <
0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
A.4.2 Regression Analysis for Remaining Time as Dependent Variable (Framed
Field Experiment)
Table A.6 shows results from GLM regressions on the remaining time. Column (1) shows
a positive and statistically signicant eect of the bonus treatment on remaining times.
e coecient and its standard error remains roughly unchanged with the addition of
controls and xed eects. Only in column (3) is the coecient just barely insignicant
(p-value=0.12). Column (5) shows the regression on the non-pooled framing treatments.
In this specication, only the Gain45 coecient is signicant. However, equality of coef-
cients of Gain45 and Loss45 cannot be rejected (p-value=0.16).
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Table A.6: GLM regressions (student sample)
GLM: Remaining time (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.894* 0.899* 0.845 0.984*





Constant -3.091*** -3.276 -2.574 -19.721*** -19.949***
(0.489) (2.018) (2.300) (2.297) (2.305)
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 268 268 268 268 268
Coecients from a generalized linear model regression with a log link of the remaining time on our treatment indicators (with
Control being the base category). Control variables added from column (2) onward include share of males in a team, a dummy
whether someone in the team has been to an escape game before and average age of the team. Sta xed eects control for the
employees of ExiteRoom present onsite. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, with ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05
and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
A.5 Hint Taking at a Specic Step in the Game
We have argued that it is unlikely that hint-taking behavior alone can explain the ob-
served performance increase of the customer teams facing incentives. In the following,
we provide some additional evidence on the relationship between hint-taking and per-
formance in our experiment. When doing so, we have to deal with two opposing eects.
First, from a theoretical perspective, worse teams are more likely to use hints (which is
also reected in the positive correlation between nishing times and number of hints
taken). Second, faster teams are more likely to take hints earlier on, as the likelihood
of facing a dicult quest is higher for them than for slower teams. at is, if incentives
make (worse) teams faster, these teams may also mechanically take more hints and this
eect also accumulates over time. In order to reduce in particular the importance of the
second eect, we collected information on the time at which teams reach a specic in-
termediate step for a subsample of 461 out of the 487 teams and compare the number of
hints taken at that specic step. We focus on the point in time at which teams entered the
last room of their specic task (Zombie Apocalypse, e Bomb, Madness), as teams reach
this step on average rather early in the game. Teams facing incentives complete this step
on average aer 22 minutes whereas teams in the control condition need on average 24
minutes (Mann–Whitney test, p-value= 0.018). Hence, teams facing the incentive condi-
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tion outperform control teams also early in the game. In Table A.7 we report results from
ordered probit models to study whether teams facing incentives are more likely to have
taken hints before the intermediate step. All ve specications reveal that team incenti-
ves do not signicantly aect the number of hints taken and also none of the marginal
eects of moving from one category (e.g. from one to two hints) to another category
turns out to be statistically signicant.
In contrast to the customer teams, we have shown that student teams (confronted
with the task by us) took on average more hints when facing incentives. Repeating the
analysis on reaching an the intermediate step above for the student sample shows that
students facing incentives reached the intermediate step signicantly earlier (they ente-
red the last room on average aer 31 minutes in Control and aer 27 minutes when facing
incentives, Mann–Whitney test, p-value= 0.004) but also took signicantly more hints
before reaching this step (see Table A.8).
Table A.7: Ordered Probit regressions: Number of hints taken when entering last room
(Field Experiment)
Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) -0.018 0.012 0.113 0.050 0.134
(0.102) (0.105) (0.126) (0.185) (0.210)
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Room Fixed Eects No No No No Yes
Observations 461 461 461 461 461
Coecients from an ordered Probit model. Dependent Variable: Number of hints taken at the intermediate step of entering the
last room. Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 2. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and ∗ =
p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Ordered Probit regressions: Number of hints taken when entering last room
(Framed Field Experiment)
Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.244* 0.235* 0.285** 0.306** 0.361**
(0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.142) (0.150)
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects No No No Yes Yes
Room Fixed Eects No No No No Yes
Observations 267 267 267 267 267
Coecients from an ordered Probit model. Dependent Variable: Number of hints taken at the intermediate step of entering the
last room. Control variables, sta and week xed eects as in Table 7. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and ∗ =
p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
A.6 RoomFixed Eects for Natural and Framed Field Experiment
Table A.9: Probit and GLM regressions including room xed eects
Probit (ME): Solved in less than 45 minutes
Field experiment (1)-(2) Framed Field Experiment (3)-(4)
Probit (ME) GLM Probit (ME) GLM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.150*** 0.266 .0763** 0.979*
(0.056) (0.173) (0.038) (0.572)
Constant 3.706*** -18.489***
(0.511) (1.950)
Fraction of control teams 0.10 0.045
solving the task in less than 45 min
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sta Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Room Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 487 487 268 268
e table shows average marginal eects from Probit regressions of whether a team solved the task within 45 minutes (1) and (3)
and coecients of GLM regressions on the remaining time (2) and (4) for the customer and the student sample. e specicati-
ons are as in Table 2 (1), A.2 (1), 7 (3), and A.6 (4), but include in addition Room Fixed Eects. Robust standard errors reported in
parentheses, and ∗ = p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
ix
A.7 Ordered Probit Regressions for Natural and Framed Field Ex-
periment: Hint taking
Table A.10: Number of hints requested
Ordered Probit: Number of hints requested
Field experiment (1)-(4) Framed Field Experiment (5)-(8)
within 60 minutes within 45 minutes within 60 minutes within 45 minutes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bonus45 (pooled) 0.116 0.086 0.341*** 0.190 0.401*** 0.395*** 0.878*** 0.933***
(0.094) (0.177) (0.094) (0.185) (0.140) (0.145) (0.142) (0.150)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sta Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Week Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 487 487 487 487 268 268 268 268
Coecients from OLS regressions of the number of hints requested within 60 minutes or 45 minutes regressed on our treatment
indicator Bonus45. Controls and xed eects identical to previous tables. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, and
∗
= p < 0.10, ∗∗ = p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ = p < 0.01.
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